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Abstract
Background: Mass gatherings, such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games, represent an enormous logistical challenge for
the host city. Health service planners must deliver routine and emergency services and, in recent Games, health legacy
initiatives, for the local and visiting population. However there is little evidence to support their planning decisions. We
therefore evaluated the strategic health planning programme for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games to
identify generalisable information for future Games.
Methods: We thematically analysed data from stakeholder interviews and documents. The data were prospectively
collected in three phases, before, during and after the Games.
Findings: We identified five key themes: (1) Systemic Improvement for example in communications, (2) Effective relationships
led to efficiencies and permanent gains, such as new relationships with the private sector (3) Difficult relationships led to
inefficiencies, for instance, duplication in testing and exercising emergency scenarios, (4) Tendency to over-estimate demand
for care, particularly emergency medicine, and (5) Difficulties establishing a health legacy due to its deprioritisation and lack
of vision by the programme team.
Interpretation: Enduring improvements which are sustained after the Games are possible, such as the establishment of new
and productive partnerships. Relationships must be established early on to avoid duplication, delay and unnecessary
expense. There should be greater critical evaluation of the likely demand for health services to reduce the wasting of
resources. Finally, if a health legacy is planned, then clear definitions and commitment to its measurement is essential.
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Introduction
Mass gatherings, such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games,
represent an enormous logistical challenge for the host city. They
require the acquisition of new competencies [1] to tackle context-
specific and generic issues. For example, local health services must
prepare to meet potential demands for emergency care, and
address access and transportation difficulties for patients and
medical supplies. They must also develop appropriate emergency
plans to meet the heightened security risk. Depending on the bid
commitments of the host country and local health service
structures, health services may need to be provided for athletes
and other accredited Olympic representatives (the ‘Olympic
Family’).
Little generalisable evidence is available to support health
services planning for the Games [2,3]. The applicability of
evidence from other mass gatherings is limited. This is because
the Games take place over a long time period (unlike large events
such as the World Cup), they involve a mainly young and healthy
spectator population (unlike mass gatherings such the Hajj) and
they are located over a number of often highly dispersed sites [4].
These factors affect the scale of demand for health and public
health services [5].
Evidence from previous Games is limited to specially established
medical services provided within Olympic venues for spectators
and the ‘Olympic Family’, and to the performance of public health
systems, with respect to infectious disease surveillance, control of
outbreaks and health promotion [6–9]. However the planning
required to maintain routine and emergency health services both
for the local population and for visitors has not been examined.
Furthermore, there is an emerging interest in the need to
demonstrate a sustainable health legacy from the Olympic
investment. This has tended to focus on urban regeneration in
the areas surrounding the main sporting venues [10]. There is little
evidence to inform the establishment of a health legacy [11] nor
any high quality research relating to the health impacts of major
multi-sport events [12].
We therefore evaluated the planning and delivery of routine and
emergency services and of health legacy initiatives during the most
recent Games held in London, England in 2012. Our main goal is
to present our main findings, focussing on identifying generalisable
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lessons for health planning and for ensuring a legacy for future
Olympics.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants gave their informed written consent. As the
study was considered to be a service evaluation, and participants
did not include patients, ethical approval from a committee was
not sought. One author (JT) had specific training in informed
consent, confidentiality and anonymity as part of her Public
Health Speciality qualification; KK and GB had training in
research ethics as part of their Masters training. All authors have
extensive experience of fully addressing standard ethics guidelines
on consent, confidentiality and anonymity, and have produced
research protocols, information sheets and consent forms which
have been accepted by ethics committees. Participants were
recruited from within the programme team and their recommen-
dations for further participants, therefore the identities of
participants were known to all taking part. However their
anonymised interview transcripts were not available to anyone
outside the research team. All raw data including audio files,
transcripts and analytic materials such as tables and charts remain
restricted to members of the research team. It will not be available
to other researchers at any date. Additional consent was taken at
each subsequent interview. All approached participants agreed to
take part, although some suggested alternative individuals who
could contribute further to the evaluation.
Settings and Participants
Interviewing. Interviews were conducted by GB (PhD), KK
(MSc) and JT (MSc, MFPH), who were all in a research associate
position. JT was also a public health specialty registrar. GB and JT
are female, KK is male. All three researchers have significant
experience of qualitative interviewing and analysis, including
training at a university level. Extra training and support was
provided by GB.
A relationship was established with the programme prior to the
interviews. Some stakeholders only met the team for the first time
at their interview. Participants were informed that the interviewer
was from a university, that the evaluation was independent of the
programme, and that our primary motivation was to learn some
generalisable lessons for future Olympic Games. All interviewers
were new to the topic of Olympic health planning and had no
prior assumptions about the programme.
We collected qualitative data in three phases, before (Oct–Nov
2011), during (May–July 2012) and after the Games (August–
November 2012). We interviewed representatives from all key
partner and stakeholder organisations, totalling 56 individuals.
NHS London was the public body responsible for planning and
delivering routine and emergency services and health legacy
initiatives for the local population [13]. We therefore interviewed
NHS London’s 2012 public health programme team in addition to
Olympic planning leads in NHS primary care clusters (known as
primary care trusts, PCTs) and acute hospitals (or hospital groups
known as trusts). Using snowball sampling, we recruited additional
respondents in partner organisations. These included the London
Ambulance Service, the Department of Health (DH), The London
Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
(LOCOG), Transport for London, the Greater London Authority,
the Health Protection Agency and health legacy partners such as
GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi Pasteur Merck Sharp & Dohme
(MSD) Limited.
Participants were approached by email for an interview, with a
copy of the information sheet attached. Interviews proceeded
using open-ended questioning about the programme. Most
interviews were conducted at the participant’s place of work, with
a small number conducted in public meeting places. The
interviews were audio recorded and transcribed, lasting approx-
imately 20–60 minutes. Respondents were interviewed a maxi-
mum of three times, depending on, for example, when they joined
the programme team (see Table 1). Eighteen respondents were
interviewed once, 11 interviewed twice and 27 interviewed all
three times. Two interviews were conducted with a group of more
than participant, all others were individual. NHS London
programme documentation was also analysed, including minutes
of programme executive meetings and progress reports.
Analysis. Transcriptions of interviews and documents were
evaluated using thematic analysis, in accordance with established
principles such as inductive line by line coding, thematic grouping
of text into codes, revision and verification of coded data, and
interpretative, overarching themes [14]. Transcripts were not
returned to participants for verification.
The three phases of interviews and the other data sources were
analysed independently and concurrently with data collection.
This allowed comparisons between datasets to be made. It also
enabled us to explore the progression of issues over the course of
the programme. Analysis was open-ended, whereby we sought to
understand programme components and processes and to identify
issues as they arose. Document analysis was undertaken chrono-
logically, to enable exploration of changing priorities and issues
over time. Three researchers (GB, KK and JT) open coded
different parts of the data using qualitative analysis software
(NVivo). Tables of codes and constituent quotations were
produced by each researcher on different topics, enabling
comparison of issues traced over time. After the third phase of
data collection, we brought together our findings from all time
periods, and compared themes between different data sources and
groups of respondents. We looked for variation within each phase
and over time.
The final five themes were decided through discussion and
debate with the whole research team, focussing on producing
results that were useful for NHS London and future planners. For
transparency, each theme is richly described using illustrative
quotations from the interviews, provided where needed with
information about the participants’ organisation, the stage of
planning at which the information was gathered and any other
relevant contextual information.
Our research is conducted with a realist perspective. Our
findings are likely to be influenced by the context and culture in
which they were measured, and we can only present findings from
our own perspective. We take it as a principle of qualitative data
that in an open ended interview, respondents will mention the
topics most important to them. Collecting three types of evidence
helped us to triangulate evidence on the phenomenon under study.
Results
Our full results are published elsewhere [https://www.ucl.ac.
uk/dahr/research_pages/index/edit/olympics; 15]. Here, we
focus on novel and important findings which have applicability
for future Games.
I. Systemic Improvement
Despite the disappointment relating to the health legacy,
respondents reported examples of sustainable systemic improve-
ments that occurred as a result of the Olympics. Arguably, the
Healthcare Planning for the Olympics
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impact of these system improvements are easier to measure and
attribute compared with health improvement impacts, because
many changes and adaptations can be put to the test when the
NHS is next put under pressure, for example in the busy winter
period. NHS London decided to include system improvements as
part of their legacy programme, identifying aspects that had been
improved in preparation for the Games: ‘‘It’s been partly spotting
things in other people’s work that actually they don’t realise is legacy but it is
and getting that, not just documented, but getting it recognised […] now
actually people will often say their report and then they’ll go oh well of course
it’s legacy.’’ Improvements were made to mechanisms for overseas
charging: ‘‘For example, the overseas charging entitlement work, there’s a
good legacy from that in that hopefully everyone will be brought up to speed on
the latest regulations and we’ll make sure that the NHS charges more efficiently
when overseas.’’
Gains were also identified in other areas: ‘‘I think where you get a
legacy that is a natural consequence of running the Olympics, […] we will
have much more detailed plans about certain elements of business continuity
planning and emergency planning.’’
Systemic improvements in reporting and internal communica-
tions were also identified after benefits became apparent during
the Games.: ‘‘And we also introduced our own internal conference calls
starting at 8 o’clock in the morning. And we’re continuing that, that’s part of
our legacy programme. […] it actually pulled all the sites together, all the key
decision makers at an operational level.’’
II. Effective Relationships Led to Efficiencies and
Permanent Gains
It was widely reported that the programme successfully
delivered due to well-established connections between the NHS
London team and effective stakeholders. NHS London were able
to work with other parts of the NHS as well as local authorities,
private sector partners and groups organising and financing local
entertainment and events as part of the cultural Olympiad (i.e.
event promoters).
Through their Olympic planning, NHS participants realised
that they shared a lot of interests with local authorities and event
promoters: ‘‘I’m learning a lot from what [local authorities are] doing and
what they’re planning and what their issues are which are very similar to
mine.’’
The NHS London programme team also felt that health had
become more visible to event promoters and that this would be
carried forward in future events: ‘‘we’ve managed to raise the profile of
health on event promoters […] they are asking health for information and for
support and working with the voluntary sector more for events.’’
Common interests between NHS organisations were also
exploited to great effect: ‘‘I work quite closely with the other two
designated hospital links. […] we have got to know each other, one of us does
something and we send it all round and the others say, ‘‘Well, that looks great,
and we use it’’.
The private sector also proved to be valuable stakeholders. NHS
London admitted that they were surprised at how supportive
private sector partners were to work with, and how much funding
they could provide: ‘‘That’s a new thing for us in health. There’s not a
huge amount of history of working with the corporate sector, and they can put a
lot of money into things that we can’t.’’
For their part, the private sector stakeholders enjoyed the
relationship and commented on how collaborative and open the
NHS were: ‘‘And we’ve often sort of almost second guessed each other, I
think, about what we feel needs to happen next […]I think it’s been a very
positive relationship.’’
III. Difficult Relationships Led to Inefficiencies
The relationship between NHS London and LOCOG was
acknowledged to be problematic at the start and in need of careful
negotiation. At the heart of this relationship was a tension with
respect to the position held by LOCOG: a private provider with its
own policies and procedures, which overlapped and abutted those
of the NHS.
Initially DH, LOCOG, NHS London and the London
Ambulance Service found it difficult to work together. Differences
in culture and priorities were widely cited, as well as confusion
over hierarchy. A member of LOCOG reported: ‘‘it all got very tense
and everybody’s vying for position and you know NHS London thought they
should be telling me what to do and I should be answering to them.’’
Delays in establishing an effective structure between DH,
LOCOG and NHS London led to duplication in effort: ‘‘I think
there was a period with a lot of people pretty much doing the same thing and
there was a lot of not being very linked together. […] you often went to
something and then went to something else and thought, ‘This is exactly the
same as we did last week, but there is two people different and all the rest of us
are the same.’’’
The most costly sources of duplication were in testing and
exercising emergency scenarios, and in the processes of assuring all
plans were ready for the Games: ‘‘There was a lot of duplication between
the NHS London EP [emergency planning] assurance process and then the
Table 1. Number of participants from each organisation interviewed at each phase of the project.
Phase
Organisation I (before Games) II (during Games) III (after Games)
NHS London 16 14 15
Cluster/borough leads 4 4 4
Department of Health 1 1 3
Olympic (designated) hospitals 3 3 4
Non-designated hospitals 3 3 6
LOCOG 2 3 2
Legacy stakeholders 4 4 4
London Ambulance Service 1 1 1
Other 4 9 7
TOTAL 38 42 39
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092338.t001
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2012 team wanting the clusters to do the assurance for the cluster, and then
provide the cluster assurance to the 2012 team’’. This duplication was
blamed on poor relationships, and a lack of central co-ordination:
‘‘I think an understanding of each organisation about a more coordinated
approach to exercises so that we’re not doing another ‘me too’ exercise and
testing the same thing is really, really important […] It’s expensive, there are
huge cottage industries being set up that aren’t terribly necessary.’’
IV. Tendency to Over-estimate Demand
In 2011 NHS London established a principle that there should
be minimal impact on local health services. However as the start of
the Games approached, many respondents asserted that it was
better to over-plan than to under-plan. Evidence from previous
Olympic and Paralympic Games was often disregarded at this
stage on the basis that ‘every Games is different’ and this was used
to justify planning for increased demand for services, especially
emergency services, in London.
The importance of risk assessment and proportionality was
often mentioned by the NHS London team. However, the
impending Games, combined with increasing senior management
interest, gave rise to growing anxiety about responsibility for
Games time delivery among respondents. The scale and political
sensitivity of the event dominated participants’ thinking in early
interviews. Primary care respondents in particular focussed on the
potential scale of major emergency events and the panic that
would ensue: ‘‘I think the really interesting challenge, actually, is what I call
enhanced business as usual. Because I’m worried about there being an
emergency. Clearly…it leaves me cold thinking about what might happen.’’
There was also evidence that NHS London were sensitive to the
publicity that the NHS might receive: ‘‘Let’s be absolutely clear that for
62 days we are going to have a gold plated response to this and […] this might
feel a little like over-kill [but] our reputation is at stake’’.
Despite this, NHS London tried to promote proportionality
through consistent communication about the scale of routine
services required: ‘‘Our messages are very clear on that […] we actually are
planning for what would be considered a mild winter so that’s what all the data
suggest.’’
Yet trusts tended to make their own calculations or to take the
upper boundaries of NHS London’s predictions as a starting point,
demonstrating their fears: ‘‘We are planning on the top, the estimates we
were given was 3–9%, we are planning on the 9%. […] So I have got enough
capacity certainly for the 9%, with the two to three admissions a day.’’
Last minute anxiety and the late involvement of senior staff in
some organisations led to extreme over-estimation of demand in
one case: ‘‘Well, initially, we planned on a 6% increase in […] Accident
and Emergency attenders. And then […] the Chief exec, felt we were being too
laid back and he said ‘‘you’ve got no evidence to support just 6% increase in
A&E attenders.’’ […] And in the end, it was agreed, through the executive
board, that we would actually do all our plans based on a 20% increase in
A&E attenders.’’
No major incidents were encountered during the Games and
the expansion of routine activity was lower than expected. Many
respondents expressed disappointment that their plans had not
been tested: ‘‘It was all a storm in a teacup over something and nothing’’.
Despite this, many respondents justified their approach: ‘‘We’ve
spent a lot of money, we’ve got people ready for it but I’d rather have that
happen than if something did happen and then the public enquiry starts and we
are the ones that are singled out as being not prepared’’. Furthermore, some
respondents argued that they had avoided problems due to the
comprehensiveness of their planning: ‘‘You over-planned. So nothing
happened, why did you bother doing all that planning? Or equally, we did all
of that planning and that’s why nothing went wrong. I think it’s probably the
latter, that because we did all of the planning and we did all of the engagement
and looked at all of the potential issues and we had spent time to look at where
the hotspots for travel were and that sort of thing.’’
V. Difficulties in Establishing a Health Legacy
The London 2012 bid was the first to include a sustainable
regeneration plan or legacy. This included a health legacy
component, ‘Go London’, led by NHS London [16]. The concept
of legacy used by NHS London appeared to evolve over the
lifetime of the programme, from an initial focus on physical
activity and health to a broader concept encapsulating both health
and system improvement. A stated aim of the initial strategy was to
use what was referred to as the ‘festival effect’ to encourage an
Olympics-inspired increase in physical activity (not only in sport
participation) across London, especially in socially disadvantaged
communities, in order to reduce health inequalities. The final
strategy incorporated wider health improvement aims and a
specific National Health Service (NHS) focus to use the Olympics
to achieve system improvements. Despite these local efforts, as the
Games approached, a number of respondents in ‘designated’
hospitals (i.e. designated to provide health care for the Olympic
Family) and primary care suggested that the legacy pledge was
perhaps the one bid commitment that the NHS could not fulfil.
We identified five themes which explain the difficulties they
encountered in establishing and demonstrating a legacy:
(i) Unclear definition. There was early confusion about
whether the health legacy should focus on sport participation,
physical activity or broader system improvement. Furthermore,
many respondents within the programme team reported difficul-
ties in defining the legacy programme. This was attributed to a
lack of clear objectives: ‘‘What I think the programme suffered from was
an actual … objective of how it was going to increase physical activity. It did it
through one or two campaigns but it never seemed to have a defined structure
around how it was going to increase or what impact it was going to have on
physical activity levels in London.’’ Respondents working in primary
care suggested that this was due to lack of conviction about what
they themselves wanted, leading to delays: ‘‘It didn’t mean anything to
anyone, we left it too late, I think we should’ve launched it but we weren’t clear
enough about what we wanted.’’
As the Games drew nearer, the concept of legacy appeared to
grow clearer, with a greater drive during this period to label
positive Olympic-driven system developments as legacy and focus
more attention on legacy initiatives. However, for some respon-
dents the legacy programme remained unclear: ‘‘it’s been quite
amorphous, this idea of health legacy. The Go London [legacy] programme
has been going on since 2009, but there didn’t seem to be a lot of clarity around
what the definition of health legacy was’’.
(ii) Constriction of the legacy programme. Minutes of the
programme executive meetings in 2010 show that DH guidance
decreed that funding would not be provided for legacy work. It
was decided that finance would be raised using a combination of
stakeholder contributions and funds sequestered from other NHS
London sources, such as underspend in other areas. In order to
raise external funding, NHS London needed to obtain commit-
ments from a substantial number of NHS chief executives as well
as the Greater London Authority Mayor’s office.
Respondents from a range of organisations reported that their
initial legacy aims were to achieve something ‘big and exciting’, with
a pan-London focus on increasing physical activity levels. The
Olympics inspired grand scale ambitions: ‘‘The legacy […] there was
a sense that […] it’s the Olympics – […] it’s got to be something big to be
worth doing, for the whole of London.’’ NHS London described
undertaking a scoping exercise into potential investment to
support a programme of this magnitude. This proved to be
unfeasible as there was not enough evidence of potential success to
Healthcare Planning for the Olympics
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garner investment: ‘‘I think we were almost, we had some really good ideas,
but we didn’t quite have the evidence base, therefore it never quite cut through
with all the partners.’’ Several respondents cited the change of
government and global recession to be responsible for this: ‘‘I think
when the Games were first awarded, then everyone was very excited about what
we might do in terms of physical activity schemes and so on. The world was
different then, in a pretty major way, the economics were different then.’’
This led to reappraisal and scaling down of the initiatives, with
the focus of the programme reduced to supporting a range of local
initiatives: ‘‘We started off with these huge ambitions and then obviously the
change in the climate politically and the cost cutting exercise meant […] we had
to think right, okay, what is important, what do we really need to focus on and
needed to narrow it down a lot more.’’ The constricted programme was
also perceived to exclude the wider population, instead targeting
NHS staff: ‘‘I have always felt we were a bit too health service focussed in the
way that we were thinking about legacy anyway, […], rather than perhaps
looking at the broader audience.’’
(iii) Deprioritisation. The primary obstacle to progressing
health legacy work in the NHS, as described by all respondents
involved in this area, was the ‘deprioritisation’ of the legacy
programme in favour of the more pressing work of Olympic
operational planning. The consequence of this was that legacy
work received a much lower level of funding and resource than
other areas. No funding was allocated by the Department of
Health for NHS London’s Olympic legacy work as part of the
2012 Programme, although funding was drawn from stakeholders
and moved across from other budgets. Central and local
perceptions of the consequences of this lack of dedicated funding
included delays to initiation of projects while alternative funding
sources were being identified. They also experienced difficulties
attracting delivery partners without substantial financial resources.
Most respondents reported that the need to ensure service
readiness for the Games took precedence over legacy ambitions: ‘‘I
would say [legacy] hasn’t been the same focus of my attention, because my
greatest focus has been on the NHS having the capability to maintain a safe
and timely service through the Olympics.’’ Respondents reported that this
was partly due to the way the legacy programme was organised in
comparison to service planning: ‘‘It would have been nice to have the
same sense of urgency and importance of oversight and scrutiny on the legacy
work, as compared to the emergency planning, Games time planning. You
know, which was extraordinarily military and top down.’’
Practical aspects impacted on legacy programme deprioritisa-
tion, such as the low priority in Olympic planning meetings: ‘‘I
think the challenge for Legacy, as someone who chairs the meeting that tries to
do legacy and planning at the same time, is that it’s always done in the last ten
minutes. […] And therefore inevitably to an extent, legacy gets less attention, it
doesn’t get the same profile.’’ This resulted in it being side-lined: ‘‘the
health legacy got knocked into… yeah. Got pushed to the back of the pile.’’
(iv) Unsustainability. Some respondents working in hospi-
tals admitted after the Games that their organisations had moved
on: ‘‘Are we consciously doing anything now with that legacy in
this organisation that’s kind of happened or been related? Not at
the moment, I don’t think.’’ This was attributed to the nature of
the organisations: ‘‘Oh, I think it’s like anything! We’ll all move
on, next thing it’s Christmas and it’ll be next year.’’
Private sector initiatives also suffered from a lack of planning to
safeguard legacy initiatives after the Games: ‘‘it was sort of really
just for the campaign as it stood, the activities that were planned
and there’s nothing planned for the future in that regard.’’ One
private sector respondent identified the lack of funding and re-
branding as crucial: ‘‘But where I see this now struggling is that
I’m not sure how it will continue and who is going to fund it […] it
almost needs to take a different form and move away from the
Olympics[…] But I’m not sure we’ve got that if I’m honest.’’
(v) Lack of measurement. No plans were made to formally
evaluate legacy initiatives. No baseline, process or outcome
measures were identified, defined or recorded, either by NHS
London planning team or by the private sector partners:
‘‘Measuring legacy I think is going to be really difficult. I don’t know how
they are going to do it.’’ Most legacy stakeholders indicated that they
would undertake some sort of appraisal, but this would take an
anecdotal, post-hoc approach: ‘‘we’re just working out how to collect the
feedback. Some of it will be quite anecdotal, because at the moment we don’t
have the budget to do a massive study to look at what people thought[…]
whether or not they actually have been motivated to change their behaviour in
any way and get a bit more active’’. Other respondents mentioned
attempts to measure the impact of legacy initiatives, but focused on
output rather than outcome measures, such as website hits: ‘‘We’ve
found a sample way of measuring how much we’ve increased referrals onto
walking groups and things like that. […] we’ve got the website, obviously we’ve
got the number of hits on that […] also we’ve got the tracker, there is a tracker
device in it that people can then go on to register for, and monitor their own
activity.’’
Discussion
This, the first independent evaluation of the planning and
delivery of local and emergency services during the Olympic and
Paralympic Games has identified five main themes with particular
applicability for future Olympic hosts. Our results suggest that if a
health legacy is envisaged, then greater attention to its definition,
prioritisation and measurement is crucial. We have also highlight-
ed the enduring system improvements which are likely to be
established in health settings where attention and resources are
focussed on procedures such as emergency preparedness and
business continuity planning. Significant financial and network
gains are possible when effective relationships are established early
in the process, but poor relationships between health organisations
produce duplication, delay and expense. Finally, we have
illustrated the difficulties in proportionate planning for the Games.
Our results indicate that partnership working between the
healthcare and other public and private bodies bring public health
knowledge and important resources into the health service. The
private sector can also offer organisational quality and service
improvement expertise to publicly funded organisations [20]. It is
important to identify such benefits and their drivers, because
significant barriers to public-private partnerships and threats to
public sector culture have been identified elsewhere [21].
The difficult relationships between the Olympic organising
committee, the government and health providers were not unique
to London. Indeed this has been shown to be a problem at many
recent Olympics and could be improved by early agreement on
co-operative roles and governance [22,23]. Relationship problems
were eventually overcome in London, but still resulted in
expensive and unnecessary duplication.
It is understandable that concerns about potential disaster at the
Games over-rode evidence-based models on likely levels of
demand for emergency and routine healthcare. This has been
demonstrated elsewhere, notably with respect to heightened
security measures [24]. If over-planning is to be avoided or
reduced, improved estimates of demand during mass events is
required, as well as effective communication about confidence in
these estimates [25].
Future hosts attempting to institute a health legacy must
maintain focus on both the vision and the detail if it is to be
effective. Evidence of a health legacy is not only scarce, but hard to
demonstrate [17]. It requires evidence of changes over time which
are associated with the Olympic health initiatives. Formal,
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adequately resourced evaluations therefore need to be embedded
at the inception of legacy planning to enable long term benefits for
the host population to be examined [3], with evidenced legacy
measurement methodology [18]. Without robust, long term
evaluations, major multi-sport events should not be justified in
terms of benefits to the host population [12]. Well-conducted
legacy and system improvement programmes could have the
greatest gains in countries that are resource poor, where
substantial quality improvement is needed in readiness for the
Games [19].
A key strength of our research methods (prospective qualitative
data collected at pertinent points over time) was that we captured
multiple perspectives, and identified processes and priorities as
they evolved and changed. Our research design was efficient,
feasible and replicable in other mass gathering contexts. However
we recommend that future evaluations also include the collection
of quantitative data and detailed information on demand for
healthcare in all settings during the Games. Such data would be
invaluable to future Games planners.
Conclusions
The Games present a significant challenge to planners of
routine and emergency health services within the host city. This
paper has presented generalisable findings relating to partner
engagement, financial planning, mass gatherings event pressures,
and the difficulties of demonstrating legacy effects. We have
demonstrated the value and feasibility of using qualitative research
methods to capture evidence which can improve both the
efficiency of routine health service provision during such events
and the success of legacy initiatives.
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